International Bulletin of Political
Psychology
Volume 14

Issue 18

Article 2

6-13-2003

CAPPSII: Caveats on Progress
IBPP Editor
bloomr@erau.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp
Part of the Aviation Safety and Security Commons, Defense and Security Studies Commons,
International Relations Commons, Other Political Science Commons, Other Psychology Commons, Peace
and Conflict Studies Commons, and the Terrorism Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Editor, IBPP (2003) "CAPPSII: Caveats on Progress," International Bulletin of Political Psychology: Vol. 14 :
Iss. 18 , Article 2.
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol14/iss18/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.

Editor: CAPPSII

International Bulletin of Political Psychology
Title: CAPPSII: Caveats on Progress
Author: Editor
Volume: 14
Issue: 18
Date: 2003-06-13
Keywords: Aviation Security, CAPPS2, Prescreening, Profiling
Abstract. This article identifies potential security shortfalls even in the context of improvements in
counterterrorist profiling.
Many aviation security authorities are attributing an improvement in profiling individuals more likely to
engage in aviation terrorism and/or other violations of security to the development and eventual fullscale fielding of the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 2 (CAPPS2). The common
assumption is that CAPPS2 will be more statistically powerful—i.e., more likely to contribute to
identifying terrorists and other security violators than other pre-existing, prescreening and profiling
systems.
However, the construct of being more powerful does not exist in a vacuum. Instead, the power of a
profiling technique is dependent on at least four other statistical parameters. One is sample size: the
number of people evaluated in the process of leading up to a statement about the power of a profiling
system. Another parameter is effect size: the salience of the profiling contribution in the environment
in which profiling is to be used. The third parameter is that of alpha level: the odds that an observed
contribution of a profiling technique is due to chance. The fourth parameter is that of efficiency: the
most profiling contribution for the least amount of expended profiling resources that has costeffectiveness implications among others.
A combination of sample size, effect size, and alpha level will yield a statistical power statement for a
profiling system. In other words, the power of the profiling system is not something intrinsic to that
system but something that depends on how it was researched and, then, on how it is actually being
employed when fielded at an airport or other locus of aviation. This last conclusion brings us to caveats
on employing improved profiling systems (as demonstrated through research).
For example, both security policymakers and aviation security officials might well posit that an improved
system would bring cost savings. Cost savings could occur if fewer people were identified as high risk,
because fewer people would then have to go through a more rigorous security applied to high risk
individuals. The rationale for identifying fewer people as high risk with an improved profiling system
would be that the assumed error rate of wrongly identifying high risk people would be lower so that one
would identify a lesser number with a higher rate of accuracy. The problem with this rationale is that as
the identification rate decreased, some point would be reached beyond which terrorists and other
security violators would not be identified at a higher rate in some population of terrorist and security
violators.
Cost savings might also occur if less stringent security procedures would be applied to people identified
as low risk individuals. After all, as one is more likely to know who is not a risk, why not apply fewer
resources to such people? However, if stringency would decrease enough, one would pass some point
beyond which a terrorist or other security violator erroneously identified as low risk could then have a
greater opportunity to be successful in violating security.
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In conclusion, CAPPS2 and all succeeding CAPPS applications may be more successful not just based on
better applied research but on how the research is applied. (See Heller, D., Levin, I. P., & Goransson, M.
(2002). Selection of strategies for narrowing choice options: Antecedents and consequences.
Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 89, 1194-1213; Levin, I. P., Prosansky, C. M.,
Heller, D., & Brunick, B. M. (2001). Prescreening of choice options in 'positive' and 'negative' decisionmaking tasks. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 14, 279-293; Peterson, J. B., Driver-Linn, E., &
DeYoung, C. G. (2002). Self-deception and impaired categorization of anomaly. Personality & Individual
Differences, 33, 327-340; Subcommittee on Aviation Hearing on Aviation Security with a Focus on
Passenger Profiling. (February 27, 2002). http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation.) (Keywords:
Aviation Security, CAPPS2, Prescreening, Profiling)
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